Abstract. We consider the Cauchy problem for an elliptic operator, formulated as a Nash game. The over specified Cauchy data are split among two players : the first player solves the elliptic equation with the Dirichlet part of the Cauchy data prescribed over the accessible boundary, and a variable Neumann condition (which we call first player's strategy) prescribed over the inaccessible part of the boundary. The second player makes use correspondingly of the Neumann part of the Cauchy data, with a variable Dirichlet condition prescribed over the inaccessible part of the boundary. The first player then minimizes the gap related to the non used Neumann part of the Cauchy data, and so does the second player with a corresponding Dirichlet gap. The two costs are coupled through a distributed field gaps. We prove that there exists always a unique Nash equilibrium, which turns out to be the reconstructed data when the Cauchy problem has a solution. We also prove that the completion algorithm is stable with respect to noise. Some numerical 2D and 3D experiments are provided to illustrate the efficiency and stability of our algorithm.
Introduction
We consider the following elliptic Cauchy problem :
where Ω is a bounded open domain in R d (d = 2, 3) with a sufficiently smooth boundary ∂Ω composed of two connected disjoint components Γ c and Γ i . The parameters k, f and Φ are given functions, ν is the unit outward normal vector on the boundary. The Dirichlet data f and the Neumann data Φ are the so-called Cauchy data, which are known on the accessible part Γ c of the boundary ∂Ω and the unknown field u is the Cauchy solution.
The above Cauchy problem is also known as a data completion problem, where the data to be recovered, or missing data, are u |Γ i and k∇u.ν |Γ i , which are determined as soon as one knows u in the whole domain Ω. Cauchy problem is a prototype of Inverse Boundary Value Problems (IBVP), which model a wide field of applications ranging from medical imaging to detection and nondestructive testing, and addressing quasi exhaustively all the hal-00648712, version 1 -6 Dec 2011 fields of physics, from electromagnetism to acoustics, fluid and structural mechanics (see e.g. [8, 9, 12, 16] ).
Classically, IBVP are known to be ill-posed. For instance, the solution of Cauchy problem does not always exist for any pair of data (f, Φ), and if such a solution exists, it does not always depend continuously on the data (Hadamard's ill-posedness, see [20] ). The Cauchy data (f, Φ) are called compatible (or consistent) if the corresponding Cauchy problem (1) has a solution (it is then unique thanks to classical continuation arguments). Ill-posedness in the sense of Hadamard makes classical numerical methods usually inappropriate because they are unstable, and there is a need for carefully stabilized dedicated computational methods, sometimes by regularizing (through reformulation of) the Cauchy problem itself. Readers may refer to a wide literature dealing with the efficient numerical solution of elliptic Cauchy problems, e.g. [3, 13, 14, 15, 17, 22] and, dealing with the ill-posedness for the Cauchy problem, [2, 10, 11] among many others.
Our purpose is to introduce an original method to solve the Cauchy problem, based on a game theory approach. We first recall in section 2 an optimal control formulation to solve the Cauchy problem used in [1] . We then show in section 3 that the control formulation naturally leads to a Nash game of static nature with complete information, which involves a Dirichlet gap and a Neumann gap costs. The existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium is proved, and when the Cauchy solution exists, it turns out that the Nash equilibrium is exactly the pair of missing data of the Cauchy problem; afterwards, we end the section with a convergence result with respect to noisy data. Section 4 is devoted to sensitivity and implementation aspects, used to lead some numerical experiments. The numerical results are presented in section 5 to illustrate the efficiency of the present game-based approach. We end the paper by some concluding remarks.
The reader interested in some PDE's oriented applications of game theory may refer to [18, 19] , and refer to [7, 23, 24] for a general introduction and proof of convergence of computational methods for Nash equilibria, and finally refer to [4, 5, 6 ] for a study of alternating algorithms which are in close link with our present approach.
An optimal control formulation of the Cauchy problem
We assume that the boundary ∂Ω and the data k, Φ and f are smooth enough, at least ∂Ω is of class C 2 and
In this case, the Cauchy solution u, if it exists, belongs to the space H 3/2 (Ω).
In [1] , the authors formulate the Cauchy problem (1) as an optimal control one. The setting is as follows :
For given η ∈ L 2 (Γ i ) and τ ∈ H 1 (Γ i ), let us define u 1 (η) and u 2 (τ ) as the unique solutions in H 1 (Ω) of the following elliptic boundary value problems :
(SP 1)
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The optimization problem amounts to minimize, among all Neumann-Dirichlet pairs
, the following "Neumann-gap" cost :
The authors in [1] proved that when the Cauchy problem (1) has a solution, then solving it is equivalent to solving the minimization problem
They also proved that the functional J 1 is twice Fréchet differentiable and strictly convex. The same conclusions above hold when a "Dirichlet-gap" cost is considered :
Let us remark that the choice of the functional spaces L 2 (Γ i ) and H 1 (Γ i ) as control spaces allows for the cost functions to be well defined, since we know from classical a priori estimates for elliptic boundary systems that u 1 and u 2 belong to the space H 3/2 (Ω) (so that the normal derivatives k∇u 1 .ν and k∇u 2 .ν belong to L 2 (Γ c ), the natural space for the flux data Φ).
A Nash game formulation of the Cauchy problem
From the previous section, we remark that, formulated in the game theory language, the Neumann and Dirichlet controls η and τ do cooperate to minimize either the Neumann-gap or the Dirichlet-gap costs. These two controls could as well cooperatively minimize any convex combination of the two costs J 1 and J 2 . Now, the fields u 1 (η) and u 2 (τ ) are aiming at the fulfillment of a possibly antagonistic goals, namely minimizing the Neumann gap k∇u 1 .ν − Φ L 2 (Γc) and the Dirichlet gap u 2 −f L 2 (Γc) . This antagonism is intimately related to Hadamard's ill-posedness character of the Cauchy problem, and rises as soon as one requires that u 1 and u 2 coincide, which is exactly what the coupling term u 1 − u 2 L 2 (Γ i ) is for. Thus, one may think of an iterative process which minimizes in a smart fashion the three terms, namely Neumann-Dirichlet-Coupling terms.
Let us define the following two costs : for any η ∈ L 2 (Γ i ) and τ ∈ H 1 (Γ i ),
where the fields u 1 (η) and u 2 (τ ) are the unique solutions to (SP1) and (SP2), respectively. Differently from the definition of J 1 , J 2 above, the coupling term is now distributed over the whole domain Ω and α is a given positive parameter (e.g. α = 1).
One may consider a decomposition-like method where the variable η is used to minimize the Neumann gap + coupling term, in other words J 1 , and τ is used to minimize the Dirichlet hal-00648712, version 1 -6 Dec 2011 gap + coupling term, which defines J 2 . Such a method fits into the area of mathematical games.
We shall say that there are two players, referred to as player 1 or Neumann-gap, and player 2 or Dirichlet-gap. Player 1 controls the strategy variable η, and player 2 controls the strategy variable τ . Each of the two players tries to minimize its own cost, namely J 1 for player 1, and J 2 for player 2. As classical, the fact that each player controls only his own strategy, while there is a strong dependance of each player's cost on the joint strategies (η, τ ) justifies the use of the game theory framework (and terminology), a natural setting which may be used to formulate the negotiation between these two costs.
In order to be consistent with the initial formulation of the Cauchy problem, the relevant game theoretic framework to deal with is a static with complete information one. In this case, a commonly used solution concept (roughly speaking, in the game vocabulary, a rational and stable one) is the one of Nash Equilibria, defined as follows :
It is of importance to notice that the present game has a separable structure. Indeed, the players criteria are formed of individual costs, the Neumann-gap depending only on η for player 1 and the Dirichlet-gap, depending only on τ for player 2, plus a common coupling cost which depends on both η and τ . Such game belongs to a family referred to as Inertial Nash Equilibration Processes in [5] . The game separable structure is crucial in our study, and we shall exploit it to prove that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium, which is shown to be the missing data when a Cauchy solution does exist. Based upon this structure of the criteria, we shall also establish a convergence result with respect to noisy data.
As a preliminary, let us remark that the field u 1 (η) is affine with respect to η, and so is the field u 2 (τ ) w.r.t. the variable τ . Thus, the functions J 1 and J 2 are quadratic. Following e.g. [1] , it is an easy exercise to compute their second order differentials.
Let us consider the case of J 1 , the one of J 2 follows the same steps. First, notice that we can set
where u 1,0 (η) solves the boundary value problem :
Then it is easy to compute the second order differential of J 1 w.r.t. η in any direction ψ ∈ L 2 (Γ i ) which reads :
Indeed, strict convexity of J 1 and J 2 holds w.r.t. the pair (η, τ ) as well. On the contrary, we shall see that partial ellipticity (or coerciveness) of the costs holds while it does not w.r.t. the pair (η, τ ), precisely because of the coupling term.
Let us again focus on the case of J 1 . If partial ellipticity fails, then there exists a sequence
Thanks to the classical regularity results and a priori estimates for elliptic BVPs, one gets
So, up to a subsequence, (u 1,0 (ψ n )) weakly converges in H 3 2 (Ω). By invoking the RellichKondrachov theorem, the sequence strongly converges to some z ∈ H 1 (Ω).
strongly converges to zero in L 2 (Ω) thanks to (10) , one has z = 0. Now, thanks to the continuity of the normal trace operator, one has ψ n → k∇z.
, which is in contradiction with |ψ n | L 2 (Γ i ) = 1. We summarize the above preliminary results in the
It is important to notice that the partial ellipticity property of η → J 1 (η, τ ) holds uniformly w.r.t. τ , and conversely for J 2 . It allows us to bound the strategy spaces if necessary.
Following [5] , let us introduce the functional L(η, τ ) as follows :
It is easy to check that L is strictly convex, and that any minimum of L is a Nash equilibrium and conversely, thanks to the separable structure of the present game (consider the necessary optimality conditions). We conclude that if a Nash equilibrium exists, then it is unique.
The existence of a Nash equilibrium
id est a pair which fulfills (8) , is obtained by a direct application of the Nash theorem : since strategy variables belong to Hilbert spaces, the uniform partial ellipticity of the costs allows for the choice of -large enough-closed bounded balls, which are then weakly compact convex sets, then continuity of the convex costs yields the weak lower semi-continuity over the so-defined balls. Finally, remark that if a Cauchy solution u does exist, then by setting η C = k∇u.ν |Γ i and τ C = u |Γ i , one has immediately L(η C , τ C ) = 0, since thanks to the uniqueness of the Cauchy solution, u 1 (η C ) = u 2 (τ C ) = u. In this case, one has that (η C , τ C ) is the minimum of the nonnegative functional L, and so it is also the Nash equilibrium (η N , τ N ).
We summarize the above results in the following:
Proposition 2 Consider the Nash game defined by (6)-(7)-(8). (i) There always exists a unique Nash equilibrium
the minimum of L(η, τ ) given by (11) .
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(ii) When the Cauchy problem has a solution u, then u 1 (η N ) = u 2 (τ N ) = u, and (η N , τ N ) are the missing data, namely η N = k∇u.ν |Γ i and τ N = u |Γ i .
Let us now consider the case of noisy data. We assume that there exists a pair of compatible data (f, Φ), and denote by u the corresponding Cauchy solution. We consider a family of not necessarily compatible data (f
For given
are solution of the respective problems :
We define the associated cost functionals :
The functions J δ 1 and J δ 2 have the properties declined in Proposition-1, so there exists a unique corresponding Nash equilibrium (η
One may ask if, when δ → 0, the Nash equilibrium (η 
Using classical a priori estimates (z δ 1 fulfills the elliptic equation with non-homogeneous Dirichlet condition, and z δ 2 a one with non-homogeneous Neumann condition), one gets :
We have previously seen that the Nash equilibrium (η
is also the unique minimum of L δ , thus we have :
and J 
Hence, k∇u 1 .ν = Φ over Γ c . Thanks to the uniqueness of the Cauchy problem, we conclude that u 1 = u. The same reasoning applied to the coupling term in J δ 1 would directly yield u 1 = u 2 and thanks to the equations (18), the two fields are equal to the Cauchy solution u as well. 
Proposition 3 Assume there exists a unique Cauchy solution
any sequence of noisy data such that
Then, the Nash game corresponding to the costs J (14)- (15) has a unique Nash equilibrium (η
to the Cauchy missing data (k∇u.ν |Γ i , u |Γ i ). Moreover, the solutions to the equations (13) , respectively u 
Numerical procedure
From the computational viewpoint, in [5] the authors propose an alternating minimization algorithm to compute the Nash Equilibrium by means of the following iterative process : Let (η 0 , τ 0 ) be a given initial state ;
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where β is a given positive parameter (e.g. β = 1).
In the cited reference, the convergence of the alternating algorithm above is proved, under suitable assumptions which also hold in our case, see Proposition 1.
Our algorithm is written as follows : Set k = 0. Starting from an initial guess
Step 1: Compute η (k) , which solves min η J 1 (η, τ (k) );
Step 2: Compute τ (k) , which solves min τ J 2 (η (k+1) , τ );
Step 3:
Redo (Step 1) until the sequence S (k) converges. As a stopping criterion we choose a classical one, the first k such that,
where ǫ is given small enough parameter. It is easy to show that the above procedure is equivalent to the algorithm (19) as soon as one uses a fixed step gradient method to solve the partial optimization problems in Step 1 and
Step 2 above. For numerical problem, we used the discetized version which was proved to converge in [24] .
To this end, the gradients may be efficiently computed by means of an adjoint state method. Let us define the following Lagrangian:
where
, where the latter two spaces are given by :
The Lagrangian is used to compute the gradients ∇ η J 1 and ∇ τ J 2 :
Proposition 4 We have the following two partial derivatives:
where λ 1 ∈ W 1 solves the adjoint problem:
where λ 2 ∈ W 2 solves the adjoint problem:
Numerical results
The computational methodology used to illustrate the efficiency of the present approach is classical. All experiments are performed on a Personal Computer and all the partial differential equations are numerically solved using FreeFem++ [21] , a Finite Element based free software. In order to obtain accurate approximations of the normal derivatives of u 1 and of λ 2 , the dual Raviart-Thomas mixed finite elements are used. We consider a domain Ω defined as the open bounded set delimited by two concentric circles in 2D test-cases, or two concentric spheres in 3D test-cases. The inner boundary plays the role of Γ i , where the trace and normal derivative are missing, and the outer one plays the one of Γ c where the latter information is over specified.
We then consider explicit well-known analytical solutions, generically denoted by u, which are harmonic inside the domain Ω, and set the trace and normal derivative of u over Γ c as being the measured data f = u |Γc and Φ = (k∇u.ν) |Γc . We sometimes refer to these data as temperature and flux (with obvious interpretation).
In order to test the robustness of the proposed method we add a white noise to the temperature f and the heat flux Φ as follows:
where σ denotes the noise level relative to . L 2 (Γc) of u and k∇u.ν respectively, whereas (w 1 , w 2 ) are normelly distributed random functions. Our algorithm performs a denoising task on the noisy prescribed Cauchy data f σ and Φ σ . For instance, let us denote by (τ σ N , η σ N ) the Nash equilibrium associated to the latter noisy over specified data. Then, the pair of optimal solutions (u 2 (τ N )| Γc , (k∇ũ 1 .ν)| Γc ) may be viewed as regularized Cauchy data obtained from the noisy Cauchy data, whereũ 1 is the solution of
We present numerical results which illustrate the stability of our method with respect to noisy data, as well as an example of the noise deblurring property underlined above. The presented graphics are related to the profiles over Γ i of the Dirichlet and Neumann missing data and to the fields u 1 and u 2 . We also provide convergence relative errors history, related to hal-00648712, version 1 -6 Dec 2011 the fields and to the missing profiles, as a function of iterations and for different noise levels. We also present a stationarity history for the Nash overall computation iterations.
The computation of the Nash equilibrium is performed as described in section 4, where the partial optimization tasks of Step-1 and Step-2 use a fixed line-search gradient method. Here, it is sufficient to carry out only few iterations in the optimization process in each step. A second formulation would be obtained, if we assume that the players compute not sequentially, but in parallel with step-1, in the Step-2 we compute τ (k) which solves min τ J 2 (η (k) , τ ).
An arbitrary initial guess such as S (0) = (η (0) , τ (0) ) = (0, 0) is chosen to start-up the algorithm, the physical function k takes the constant value 1 in Ω, and the parameters α (weight of the coupling term in the costs) and t (relaxation parameter in the computation of Nash equilibrium) are set to α = 1 and t = 0.25.
Two 2D test-cases
We consider an annular domain Ω with circular boundary components Γ i and Γ c , both centered at (0, 0) and with radii R i = 0.6 and R c = 1, respectively. Test-case A. The first 2D experiment is related to a smooth case. The -artificial-Cauchy data f and Φ are defined as respectively the trace and normal derivative, over the circle Γ c , of the harmonic function :
u(x, y) = e x cos(y).
In figure-1, the missing data τ N and η N are presented at convergence of the algorithm (19) dedicated to the computation of the Nash equilibrium, for different noise levels σ. The obtained Dirichlet as well as Neumann profiles show remarkable stability with respect to noise.
Test-case B. The second 2D experiment is related to the singular function :
In this case, the singularity source, located at a = (0.5, 0), is in the vicinity of the circle Γ i , and reconstruction of the solution over this boundary is a numerically challenging task, particularly in the case of noisy data. The results in figure-2 show again the stability of our method. The profile shape is well captured including the localization of the singularity peak, whose magnitude is however underestimated for the trace as well as for the normal derivative.
Finally, the denoising effect, through computing the Nash equilibrium and solving of equation (24), is actually observed in figure-3 for a noise level of 5%.
Two 3D test-cases
As for the 2D case, we consider a thick spherical shell domain Ω with boundary components Γ i and Γ c , which are two spheres both centered at (0, 0, 0) and with radii given by respectively R i = 0.6 and R c = 1.
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Again two functions, denoted by u, are selected to play the role of exact solutions to the Cauchy problem for the Laplace operator. To this end, the Cauchy data f and Φ are defined as respectively the trace and normal derivative of the involved functions over the sphere Γ c .
Test-case C. The first function is radial, so it is of constant trace over each of the spherical components of the boundary:
u(x, y, z) = 1
The function u given by (25) is the solution of ∆u = δ 0 , where δ 0 is the Dirac distribution at the origin (0, 0, 0), a point source that is not in Ω, so u is harmonic and smooth enough inside Ω.
In figure-4 , level set slices are shown for the fields u 1 and u 2 at convergence for noise free and 5% noisy data. The overall Nash algorithm (19) converged in 150 iterations. More detailed issues related to the convergence are presented in figure-5. Relative L 2 -errors behave well in the noise free and in the noisy cases. The relative errors on reconstructed fields decrease as well as do the ones relative to the missing data (converged Nash strategies, which we recall are respectively the trace of u 1 and the normal trace of u 2 over the sphere Γ i ).
The sensitivity of the reconstructed fields and missing data to the noise level σ is shown in figure-6 . Interestingly, boundary missing data are much less sensitive than the domain distributed fields. Both of them exhibit a satisfactory stable behavior w.r.t. the noise magnitude.
Test-case D. The second function is given by u(x, y, z) = 1
The function u given by (26) is the non-radial solution of ∆u = δ X 0 , where the source term is now X 0 = (−0.2, 0, 0).
In this experiment we put 5% of noise in (f, Φ) according to (23) . The obtained results are illustrated in figure-7 , where the reconstructed fields u 1 and u 2 are presented at convergence. The non radial missing data are presented in figure-8 and relative L 2 -errors on the reconstructed fields and boundary data are shown in figure-9 . Even though the error curves do monotonically decrease towards zero for the two testcases C and D, the stagnation that appears quite early (around iterations 80-120 in the present case) suggests that multilevel or hierarchical optimization approaches should be designed to speed-up the convergence of the Nash algorithm.
Conclusion
Let us conclude the paper with some short remarks. First of all, we have used the simplest class of games to model the completion problem, namely the class of static games with complete information. This simple game formulation yields interesting results like the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium even when the Cauchy data are not compatible, and also the fact that the Nash equilibrium is the missing data when the Cauchy hal-00648712, version 1 -6 Dec 2011 problem has a solution. Investigation of more sophisticated classes of games such as dynamical games with incomplete information may lead to new efficient data completion algorithms. It is also interesting to notice that solving the data completion problem with our method makes use of the standard computational tools, be it finite element or optimization codes. The numerical experiments presented for different test-cases prove that our method exhibits remarkable numerical stability with respect to noisy Cauchy data. hal-00648712, version 1 -6 Dec 2011
